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INTRODUCTION 
Offshore oil and gas resources can be located in two different types of 
maritime areas subject to state jurisdiction: first, those that are under the 
clear and undisputed jurisdiction of one or more coastal States; and, 
second, those where there is no established or agreed maritime boundary 
that divides the jurisdiction of two or more coastal States, i.e., maritime 
areas of overlapping claims or disputed maritime areas.1 Although in 
principle these two types of maritime areas raise different legal 
questions, a common legal issue that may arise in these otherwise distinct 
contexts is the extent to which a State, or petroleum companies pursuant 
to the approval of a State, can take unilateral (i.e., without the consent of 
another State) acts in relation to oil and gas resources in either of these 
types of areas. 
Every now and then, it has been assumed that the operational rule that 
is applicable when it comes to accessing these fields in both situations—
that is, when oil and gas fields are located in maritime areas of 
overlapping claims and when they straddle an established maritime 
boundary—is the rule of capture.2 Preliminarily, the rule of capture can 
be defined as follows: one State is allowed to start drilling and exploiting 
a shared oil or gas reservoir without the consent of another State.3 The 
application of the rule of capture has undergone two phases of changes in 
sphere of operation. First, although it developed in the context of oil and 
gas operations on land, its scope was subsequently enlarged so as to 
include the seas and oceans.4 Second, in the offshore context, whereas it 
  
 1. See G.H. Blake & R.E. Swarbrick, Hydrocarbons and International 
Boundaries: A Global Overview, in BOUNDARIES AND ENERGY: PROBLEMS AND 
PROSPECTS 3, 3 (Gerald Blake et al. eds., 1998) [hereinafter BOUNDARIES AND ENERGY]. 
 2. See, e.g., Emmanuel Voyiakis, Shared Oil and Gas Resources, in OIL AND 
GAS LAW IN KAZAKHSTAN: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 77, 77–78 (Ilias 
Bantekas et al. eds., 2004). 
 3. See, e.g., Ian Townsend-Gault, Rationales for Zones of Co-operation, in 
BEYOND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 114, 121 (Robert Beckman et 
al. eds, 2013) [hereinafter BEYOND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES]; Dominic Roughton, The 
Rights (and Wrongs) of Capture: International Law and the Implications of the 
Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, 26 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES L. 374, 382–83 (2008). 
 4. See, e.g., Masahiro Miyoshi, The Basic Concept of Joint Development of 
Hydrocarbon Resources on the Continental Shelf, 3 INT’L J. ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 1, 
5-6 (1988). 
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has been traditionally largely reserved for situations where an oil and gas 
field straddles a maritime boundary, its application has been widened by 
some authors so as to encompass maritime areas of overlapping claims 
and any oil and gas resources that may be located in such areas.5 
Illustrating the perceived primacy of the rule of capture in both of the 
aforementioned situations is the position taken by Bundy, who argues 
that at sea “the exploitation of international oil and gas reserves is still 
based largely on the [rule] of capture.”6 The effect of the rule of capture 
is that States are allowed to take as much of the available oil and gas 
resources as possible, which accords “well with the spirit of laissez 
faire.”7  
Unregulated and unconstrained actions conducted by States, regarding 
the development of oil and gas resources located in maritime areas where 
either a boundary has been established or where it is absent, can be 
detrimental in a number of ways.8 Inefficient and competitive drilling are 
two associated negatives that are accepted under the rule of capture;9 its 
defining characteristics will be further elaborated on in Part I. 
As mentioned above, the precise issues brought out by the scenarios 
where an oil and gas field straddles an established maritime boundary or 
where a particular field is located within a maritime area that is subject to 
the overlapping claims of at least two coastal States are, to a certain 
extent, different.10 In this contribution, emphasis will be placed on oil 
and gas fields that are located in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and 
  
 5. See, e.g., Roughton, supra note 3, at 374–75. 
 6. See Rodman R. Bundy, Natural Resource Development (Oil and Gas) and 
Boundary Disputes, in THE PEACEFUL MANAGEMENT OF TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES 23, 
24 (Gerald H. Blake et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter THE PEACEFUL MANAGEMENT]. 
 7. Ian Townsend-Gault, Maritime Cooperation in a Functional Perspective, in 
MARITIME ENERGY RESOURCES IN ASIA: LEGAL REGIMES AND COOPERATION 7, 16 (Clive 
Schofield ed., 2012). 
 8. See Miyoshi, supra note 4, at 5–6; Peter D. Cameron, The Rules of 
Engagement: Developing Cross-Border Petroleum Deposits in the North Sea and the 
Caribbean, 55 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 559, 569–70 (2006). See generally Joseph W. Morris, 
The North Sea Continental Shelf: Oil and Gas Legal Problems, 2 INT’L L. 191, 206 
(1968).  
 9. See Danielle Beggs & John Stockdale, Unitisation and Unitisation 
Agreements, in OIL AND GAS: A PRACTICAL HANDBOOK 81, 81 (Geoffrey Picton-
Turbervill ed., 2d ed. 2014); Charles Robson, Transboundary Petroleum Reservoirs: 
Legal Issues and Solutions, in THE PEACEFUL MANAGEMENT, supra note 6, at 3, 5–6. 
 10. Blake & Swarbrick, supra note 1, at 3. 
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the continental shelf, which are either delimited or undelimited;11 the 
specifics of these two maritime zones will be elaborated on in Part II.  
The Article will begin by addressing the key issue of where there is a 
resolved maritime boundary between the coasts of States, but an oil and 
gas field straddles this construed boundary. Due to the fugitive character 
of oil and gas resources—combined with the fact that they are kept in 
place under great pressure in the strata of the continental shelf—when 
drilling into a reservoir, the oil and gas reserves contained therein “will 
migrate to the point(s) of perforation.”12 Given these physical attributes 
of oil and gas, and that they will not remain stationary in one place if a 
reservoir is pierced, the commencement by State A with the development 
on its own side of the boundary line might result in the siphoning off of 
resources from the other side—the side of State B. The key question that 
follows is: from the perspective of international law, is one State allowed 
to engage in operations concerning a reservoir that straddles a maritime 
boundary without the consent of the State from whose side the resources 
are likely to migrate from? 
There are also situations in which oil and gas resources are located in 
disputed maritime areas: that is, where more than one State has a 
legitimate claim to the maritime area, but no determination has been 
made as to where the final maritime boundary between the coasts of 
claimant States lies. In practice, it is fairly common that, despite the lack 
of a maritime boundary, activities will commence in connection with oil 
and gas under the approval of only one claimant.13 Frequently, unilateral 
acts connected to the development of these resources, whether it is 
seismic work, drilling, or exploitation, engender difficulties between 
  
 11. For an analysis of issues brought out by overlapping territorial seas, see 
David H. Anderson & Youri van Logchem, Rights and Obligations in Areas of 
Overlapping Maritime Claims, in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES AND LAW OF THE SEA 
192, 195–97 (S. Jayakumar et al. eds., 2014). 
 12. Clive H. Schofield & Ian Townsend-Gault, Choppy Waters Ahead in “a Sea 
of Peace Cooperation and Friendship”?: Slow Progress Towards the Application of 
Maritime Joint Development to the East China Sea, 35 MARINE POL’Y 25, 29 (2011). 
 13. For example, in May 2014, China moved an oil rig (Haiyang Shiyou 981) into 
position in an area that is in addition claimed by Vietnam (i.e., off the coast of Triton 
Island in the Paracel Islands) and commenced with drilling work. See Zhou Fangyin, 
Between Assertiveness and Self-Restraint: Understanding China’s South China Sea 
Policy, 92 INT’L AFF. 869, 884–85 (2016). 
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States that have overlapping claims over the same maritime area.14 The 
extent of the difficulties that may materialize will, however, depend on 
the given locality and the type of activity concerned. A more general rule 
of thumb is that the perceived sensitivity of a unilateral act varies with 
the change to the status quo it affects: drilling is, almost inevitably, to 
stir up controversy, whereas the more modest activity of seismic work 
might only be problematic between certain compositions of claimant 
States. Central to where there is no determined continental shelf or EEZ 
boundary is the following question: can States that have disputed EEZ or 
continental shelf areas begin with activities concerning oil and gas 
resources in the disputed area prior to the final determination of a 
maritime boundary or in the absence of agreed means of cooperation? 
This question can be split into three sub-questions, according to the 
specific type of activity undertaken in relation to oil and gas resources. 
First, is one claimant State allowed to capture information on the 
composition of the seabed, and the amount of mineral resources 
contained therein, through conducting seismic work? Second, can one 
claimant freely commence with drilling into the continental shelf, capture 
a core sample therefrom, and use the information it provides to its sole 
benefit? Third—this is how the rule of capture is more traditionally 
understood—can one claimant of a disputed area start with the actual 
development of an oil and gas reservoir without the consent of another 
claimant State?  
This Article will begin clarifying the gist of the rule of capture and its 
application in two different contexts: on land and at sea.15 After the 
modalities of the rule of capture have been laid out, attention will be 
turned to an explanation of the general contours of the maritime zones of 
the EEZ and the continental shelf, to which coastal States have 
entitlements under international law of the sea.16 Next, the rights that 
States have over oil and gas resources of the seabed under international 
law of the sea will be canvassed.17 Often, claimed entitlements of States 
  
 14. See Craig Snyder, The Implications of Hydrocarbon Development in the 
South China Sea, 52 INT’L J. 142, 146 (1996); Youri van Logchem, The Scope for 
Unilateralism in Disputed Maritime Areas, in THE LIMITS OF MARITIME JURISDICTION 175 
(Clive H. Schofield et al. eds., 2014) [hereinafter THE LIMITS]. 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
 17. See infra Part II.A.  
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to the maritime zones of the EEZs and continental shelves will conflict in 
localities where the distance between the designated baselines of States is 
less than 400 nautical miles (nm).18 Removing this overlap can be 
achieved by effecting a delimitation of the maritime boundary between 
the coasts of the relevant States.19 However, arriving at final delimitation 
regularly proves a difficult task for States concerned.20 In the absence of 
delimitation, there will be a coexistence of sets of sovereign rights of two 
or more claimant coastal States over the same physical marine space.21 
This co-existence of rights lies at the root of the issue that possible 
difficulties may transpire, if one claimant decides to act on these rights 
without another State’s approval—this will be discussed in Part II.B.2. 
Before discussing the issues that arise if oil and gas resources are locked 
away in a disputed continental shelf, the emphasis will be placed on 
those cases where the matter of determining a maritime boundary has 
been disposed of, but where there is an oil and gas reservoir that does not 
observe the regularities of this maritime boundary; i.e., the resource 
straddles the boundary.22 A failure to successfully complete final 
delimitation, with the result that the overlapping claims to EEZs or 
continental shelves of at least two coastal States will coexist, does not 
automatically have the effect that claimants will avoid taking acts in 
relation to a disputed area.23 Identifying the quantity of oil and gas that is 
contained therein through conducting seismic work and subsequently 
taking steps towards their development are every now and then 
undertaken by only one of the claimant States concerned, without the 
consent of the other State(s).24 The extent to which international law 
imposes an obligation to cooperate on claimants regarding unilaterally 
  
 18. See infra Part II.B. 
 19. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 20. For instance, 48 rounds of negotiations were conducted between Ireland and 
the United Kingdom, before they agreed on where the continental shelf boundary lies 
between their coasts in 1988. See Agreement Between the Government of Ireland and the 
Government of the United Kingdom Concerning the Delimitation of Areas of the 
Continental Shelf Between the Two Countries, ITS No. 1/1990 (Gr. Brit-Ir.). 
 21. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 196, 198. 
 22. See infra Part III. 
 23. See infra Part IV. 
 24. See Daniel J. Dzurek, Southeast Asian Offshore Oil Disputes, 11 OCEAN Y.B. 
157, 163–64 (1994). For example, in disputed parts of the Natuna Sea, Indonesia has 
engaged in unilateral seismic work, which drew the protest of Vietnam. 
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undertaken acts in connection with oil and gas resources in disputed 
areas will be discussed in Part V. Critical in this analysis is the role of 
paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (LOSC, or Convention), which seeks to regulate areas 
of overlapping EEZs and continental shelves. 25 This commonly phrased 
provision, laying down two different obligations—one to cooperate and 
the other to prevent certain conduct from commencing—significantly 
influences the possibility for claimants to unilaterally conduct activities 
concerning oil and gas resources in disputed maritime areas. The 
contribution will round off by summarizing the main arguments that have 
been presented, in order to draw some conclusions as to what status the 
rule of capture currently enjoys concerning oil and gas related 
exploitation and exploration activities at sea.26 
I. CLARIFYING THE RULE OF CAPTURE 
A. The (Traditional) Application of the Rule of Capture on Land  
Straddling oil and gas resources, and their fugacious properties, have 
long been known. Reflecting this are the earliest discussions of the 
relevant rule and the relevance of a rule of capture on the national level, 
which go back to the mid-nineteenth century.27 In certain domestic laws, 
including those of the United Kingdom and United States, the rule of 
capture has been recognized in the context of oil and gas operations on 
land.28 In fact, this rule has formed the basis on which the oil and gas 
industry in the United States has modeled its operations.29 One 
application of this rule is that despite landowners having property rights 
to the oil and gas that is located below their land, others may, under 
certain circumstances, take this oil and gas; that is, if through the lawful 
drilling of a well on one’s own land, oil and gas that is located under 
  
 25. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arts. 74, 83, Dec. 10, 1982, 
1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter LOSC]. 
 26. See infra Part VI.  
 27. See Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture – An Oil 
and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 899-905 (2005). 
 28. Id. at 906; TERENCE DAINTITH, FINDERS KEEPERS? HOW THE LAW OF CAPTURE 
SHAPED THE WORLD OIL INDUSTRY 8 (2010). 
 29. DAINTITH, supra note 28, at 8. 
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someone else’s land is caused to migrate to the former.30 Compensation 
for this loss cannot be claimed by the owner of the land from where the 
oil and gas migrated.31 The only recourse available is to commence with 
drilling on one’s own land, which may, possibly, result in a remigration 
of the originally lost oil and gas.32 Landowners, effectively without a 
legal remedy, are spurred on to engage in competitive and uncontrolled 
drilling to undo the possible loss of oil and gas that used to be located 
under one’s land.33 Seemingly, this scheme will inevitably lead to waste 
of oil and gas resources and their uneconomic development.34 
B. The Application of the Rule of Capture at Sea 
The rule of capture has been transposed to situations where oil and 
gas fields are located in disputed maritime areas or where these fields 
straddle a construed boundary that divides the jurisdictions of coastal 
States. Applied to the context of a straddling oil and gas field, or a field 
that is located in a disputed maritime area, the effect of the rule of 
capture would be that one State is allowed to take any or all of the oil and 
gas resources; this however heavily affects another State’s rights that are 
attributed to it under the law of the sea.35 In debates about what rules of 
international law govern the conduct of operations in relation to offshore 
oil and gas resources that are located in maritime areas under the claimed 
or established jurisdiction of States, voices have sometimes emerged 
stating that the guiding and prevailing norm in this context is the rule of 
  
 30. See Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as 
Applied to Oil and Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 393 (1935); Melissa H. Loja, Who Owns the 
Oil that Traverses a Boundary on the Continental Shelf in an Enclosed Sea? Seeking 
Answers in Natural Law Through Grotius and Selden, 27 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 893, 897 
(2014). 
 31. See Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas Co. v. De Witt, 18 A. 724, 725 
(1889). 
 32. See Townsend-Gault, supra note 3, at 121; Loja, supra note 30, at 893, 897–
98. 
 33. See Townsend-Gault, supra note 3, at 121; Roughton, supra note 3, at 382–
84. 
 34. Robson, supra note 9, at 5–6.  
 35. BRITISH INST. OF INT’L AND COMPARATIVE LAW, 1 JOINT DEVELOPMENT OF 
OFFSHORE OIL AND GAS 33 (Hazel Fox et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter 1 JOINT 
DEVELOPMENT]. 
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capture.36 Although there is no rule in international law that explicitly 
addresses the status of a rule of capture, nor a direct legitimation that can 
be invoked for adopting this practice at sea, support for the existence of 
such a rule has been gathered from how States, arguably, go about in 
dealing with offshore deposits of oil and gas resources. The assumption 
concerning the application of the rule of capture as being the 
predominant one under international law runs as follows: States will be 
guided in their conduct by the rule of capture as they seek to maximize 
the production of an oil and gas field.37 This, combined with the fact that 
certain States will encourage holders of concessions to start drilling—or 
even to take an oil and gas field located within a disputed area or one that 
straddles a determined maritime boundary into production—regardless of 
another State’s objections,38 further signifies the relevance of assessing 
whether international law supports the (claim of) existence of an 
international rule of capture that is applicable in such situations. It must 
be kept in mind that, from the perspective of international law, the oil 
and gas industry, being a private actor, is not one of the addressees 
whose behavior international law seeks to directly regulate in these 
situations.39 There are some examples that might be invoked in support 
of the rule of capture as the guiding rule that operates at sea in 
connection with oil and gas resources. One example is the case between 
Ghana and Cȏte D’Ivoire, where Ghana undertook preliminary actions 
necessary to begin producing oil from the disputed maritime area. Before 
the dispute over the course of the maritime boundary running between 
their coasts was brought to the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
  
 36. George W. Hardy, III, The Doctrine of Correlative Rights: Origins and 
Modern Applications, 35 ANN. INST. ON MIN. L. 167, 169–70 (1992); Bundy, supra note 
6, at 24. 
 37. Voyiakis, supra note 2, at 77. 
 38. See, e.g., SELIG S. HARRISON, SEABED PETROLEUM IN NORTHEAST ASIA: 
CONFLICT OR COOPERATION? 11–13 (2005). For example, in 1973, a US petroleum 
company obtained a concession from South Korea and began drilling two wells in an area 
of the Yellow Sea that is also claimed by China. Id. at 11. This unilateral move was 
opposed by China. Id. at 11–12. Despite China’s objections, South Korea was adamant 
on that Gulf Oil would honor the terms of the concession and proceed with drilling. Id. at 
12. 
 39. See Youri van Logchem, Submarine Telecommunication Cables in Disputed 
Maritime Areas, 45 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 107, 114–15 (2014). 
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Sea (ITLOS) in order to be resolved,40 and thus in the absence of a final 
definition of the overlapping entitlements of the States concerned, Ghana 
moved all infrastructure required for the development of oil into place in 
the maritime area of overlapping claims, possibly to take some of the oil 
that might ultimately belong to Cȏte D’Ivoire.41  
Other examples derived from State practice that possibly support the 
existence of a rule of capture in the context of a maritime area of 
overlapping claims are that sometimes claimant States will accuse each 
other of having proceeded to the stage of development without having a 
final maritime boundary or pursuant to an agreed cooperative modality. 
Along these lines, the Democratic Republic of the Congo accused 
Angola of starting with the unilateral production of petroleum resources 
from the disputed continental shelf, prior to their agreement to bring 
activities related to these resources under a joint regime.42 Further, the 
existence of a group of gas fields in the East China Sea, whose properties 
might be such that they straddle a hypothetical equidistance boundary 
running between the coasts of China and Japan, has led to accusations of 
the latter that through developmental activities on the Chinese side, oil 
and gas resources placed on the Japanese side have been abstracted.43 
China took the position that, given that the oil and gas fields fall within 
its side of the equidistance line, there can be no dispute over these 
activities; in fact, due to their placement, the fields are according to 
China undoubtedly under its jurisdiction, thereby allowing it to apply its 
  
 40. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary Between Ghana 
and Cȏte D’Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cȏte D’Ivoire), Case No. 23, Order of 
Apr. 25, 2015, 
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.23_prov_meas/C23_Orde
r_prov.measures_25.04.2015_orig_Eng.pdf. 
 41. Id. at ¶¶ 76–77, 79. 
 42. BRITISH INST. OF INT’L & COMPARATIVE LAW, REPORT ON THE OBLIGATIONS 
OF STATES UNDER ARTICLES 74(3) AND 83(3) OF UNCLOS IN RESPECT OF UNDELIMITED 




 43. See Pieter H.F. Bekker, Maritime Boundary Disputes Risk Investment in 
Offshore Energy Projects, 21 NAT. GAS & ELEC. 10, 10 (2005); Deniz Tas, Oil and Gas in 
the East China Sea: Maritime Boundaries, Joint Development and the Rule of Capture, 
2011 INT’L ENERGY L. REV. 48, 50. 
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national oil and gas policies.44 Although recognizing that the oil and gas 
fields discovered by China are placed on its side of the hypothetical 
equidistant boundary, Japan has, nonetheless, argued that it is entitled to 
a share of the oil and gas resources because the geological properties of 
these fields are such that they physically extend to the Japanese side of 
the line.45 
The existence of an international rule of capture in connection with oil 
and gas that is located in areas where a settled maritime boundary is 
absent, or where there is a straddling deposit, has been fairly widely 
disputed.46 For instance, Miyoshi has outright dismissed the validity of 
the rule of capture at sea, arguing that there is no such rule in 
international law, irrespective of the fact that oil and gas is located in a 
disputed maritime area or that it straddles a construed boundary.47 Ong, 
after identifying the difference in opinion that exists on the matter, has 
taken the position that there is “no explicit provision” in international 
law that shows the primacy of the rule of capture at sea over cooperation 
sought regarding a shared deposit.48  
Within areas of overlapping claims, a unilateral progression by a 
claimant State to the phase of exploitation has a number of effects for the 
States concerned: first, it is inevitable to affect the other claimant’s 
inherent rights over the continental shelf that is attributed to it under the 
law of the sea;49 and, second, the move to unilaterally develop an oil and 
gas field is likely to engender various degrees of dispute between the 
acting State and the claimant(s) that are faced with the behavior. The 
latter is difficult to square with the fact that States, as a more general 
principle of international law, have to abstain from aggravating or 
  
 44. Gao Jianjun, A Note on the 2008 Cooperation Consensus Between China and 
Japan in the East China Sea, 40 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 291, 294 (2009). 
 45. Joint Press Conference, Masahiko Koumura, Minister of Foreign Affairs & 
Akira Amari, Minister of Econ., Trade & Indus., Japan, Regarding Cooperation Between 
Japan and China in the East China Sea (June 18, 2008), 
www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2008/6/0618.html. 
 46. Miyoshi, supra note 4, at 18; Int’l Law Ass’n, Int’l Comm. on the Exclusive 
Econ. Zone, Rep. of the Sixty-Third Conference, at 531 (Aug. 27, 1988). 
 47. Miyoshi, supra note 4, at 6, 18. 
 48. David M. Ong, Joint Development of Common Offshore Oil and Gas 
Deposits: “Mere” State Practice or Customary International Law?, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 
771, 777 (1999). 
 49. 1 JOINT DEVELOPMENT, supra note 35, at 33. 
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extending a dispute, a concept which is, arguably, reflected in the 
negative obligation contained in paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the 
LOSC to not hamper or jeopardize final delimitation.50 Activities 
performed in the stages that precede the taking into production of an oil 
and gas field—that is, taking a seismic survey or drilling an exploratory 
well—can themselves amount to disputes between States that have 
overlapping claims over the same EEZ or continental shelf.  
II. OIL AND GAS RESOURCES IN EEZS AND CONTINENTAL SHELVES  
Pursuant to the LOSC, coastal States are entitled to extend their 
claims to sovereignty, sovereign rights, and jurisdiction over different 
maritime zones that are located at different distances from their coast.51 
Coastal States are entitled to a continental shelf extending to a maximum 
of 200 nm or beyond in accordance with Article 76 of the Convention; 
one critical requirement in this respect is that there is a physical 
continental shelf beyond the 200 nm mark.52 The sovereign rights coastal 
States have over their continental shelf53 are inherent and are ab initio 
and de jure attached to it.54 Activities that facilitate the actual exercise of 
a State’s sovereign rights over oil and gas resources in the continental 
shelf, both in their discovery as well as factual development, are amongst 
those that can only be conducted by the coastal State or under its 
authority.55 Drilling into the continental shelf,56 or erecting and 
emplacing other installations and structures that are used in connection 
with oil and gas related activities, will thus undoubtedly require the 
  
 50. Natalie Klein, Provisional Measures and Provisional Arrangements in 
Maritime Boundary Disputes, 21 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 423, 458 (2006) (“The 
concept of non-aggravation is affirmed in paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 . . . .”). 
 51. The further the maritime zone is away from a State’s coast, the lesser the 
amount of authority it has: territorial sea; contiguous zone; EEZ; continental shelf.  
 52. Dominic Roughton & Colin Trehearne, The Continental Shelf, in 1 THE IMLI 
MANUAL ON INTERNATIONAL LAW: LAW OF THE SEA 137, 156–58 (David Joseph Attard et 
al. eds., 2014). 
 53. See, e.g., Continental Shelf (Libya v. Malta), Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, ¶¶ 
19–20 (June 3). 
 54. North Sea Continental Shelf, (Ger./Den; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J 
Rep. 3, ¶¶ 19, 39 (Feb. 20); MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES AND 
MARITIME DELIMITATION 55 (1989). 
 55. LOSC, supra note 25, arts. 60, 80. 
 56. Id. art. 81. 
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consent of the relevant coastal State. Also, the coastal State is in a 
position to proclaim and enforce legislation that sees to the use of oil and 
gas resources. Having sovereign rights over the continental shelf is 
accompanied by a certain autonomy for the coastal State as to how it 
wants to utilize any of the resources it contains—if it wishes to utilize 
them at all.57 It can therefore be assumed that there rests no obligation on 
the relevant coastal State to actually exploit the continental shelf; 
deferring or abstaining from exploitation are both valid options for 
States.58  
Further, coastal States are entitled to establish an EEZ, by 
proclamation, extending to a maximum of 200 nm.59 Most coastal States 
have claimed an EEZ,60 although in certain parts of the world, States 
(e.g., those having coastal fronts on the Mediterranean Sea)61 have 
refrained from claiming one. Coastal States are granted exclusive 
sovereign rights, as well as a number of jurisdictional rights over both 
living and nonliving natural resources (e.g., oil and gas) that are found on 
the seabed within 200 nm, and perhaps beyond that distance, from a 
State’s designated baselines, in addition to those resources that live in the 
water column.62 Rights over the seafloor can thus attach to the coastal 
State both by virtue of the entitlements they have over an EEZ as well as 
the continental shelf, either of which provides it with exclusive access to 
all nonliving resources that are contained therein.63 The legal link that 
exists between the concepts of the EEZ and continental shelf, which are 
conterminous, is emphasized in paragraph 3 of Article 56 of the LOSC: 
in the exercise of EEZ rights concerning the seabed, a State must act in 
accordance with the provisions of Part VI of the Convention on the 
continental shelf. 
  
 57. Id. arts. 60, 80 & 81. 
 58. SHIGERU ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES 167 (1989). 
 59. LOSC, supra note 25, art. 57. 
 60. See generally R. R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA app. 1 at 
463–71 (3d ed. 1999). 
 61. See Gemma Andreone, The Legal Regime of Fisheries in the Mediterranean: 
Some Issues Concerning Italy, 11 ITALIAN. Y.B. OF INT’L L. 231, 231–32 (2001). 
 62. LOSC, supra note 25, arts. 56–57. 
 63. Id. art. 77.2 (regarding the continental shelf); id. at 56.2 (regarding the 
exclusive economic zone). 
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A. Developing Oil and Gas Resources 
The right to exploit oil and gas resources is vested in the coastal State 
by virtue of enjoying sovereign rights over an EEZ and the continental 
shelf; this enables the coastal State concerned to exploit its oil-containing 
strata.64 The amount of oil and gas resources that are contained in all the 
continental shelves combined are significant.65 An important limitation is 
that if a maritime boundary has been determined, this boundary forms the 
outer limit of where the coastal State can engage freely in activities in 
connection with oil and gas resources.66 It is important to note that after 
the discovery of an oil and gas field, instant production from it is not 
possible; in fact, production usually will be approximately ten years 
away.67 Beyond attributing to a coastal State a right to develop the oil 
and gas resources, their factual exploitation from the continental shelf is 
not further circumscribed in the LOSC.68 Testifying to this is that in the 
Convention there are neither limitations placed on the quantity of 
hydrocarbon resources a State can extract from its continental shelf, nor 
are methods prescribed that a coastal State has to use in extracting these 
resources from a continental shelf.69 Along these lines, it can also be 
observed that the Convention does not contain a provision that is 
explicitly written with a view to circumscribing the rights and obligations 
of States in areas of overlapping entitlements regarding hydrocarbons 
and connected activities, such as the emplacement of installations or 
other activities that may commence on the continental shelf.70 Similarly, 
the Convention is of limited help if an oil and gas field does not neatly 
  
 64. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 583–85 (6th ed. 2008). 
 65. See Victor Prescott, Resources of the Continental Margin and International 
Law, in CONTINENTAL SHELF LIMITS: THE SCIENTIFIC AND LEGAL INTERFACE 64, 75–77 
(Peter J. Cook & Chris M. Carleton eds., 2000). 
 66. See, e.g., Loja, supra note 30, at 895–96. 
 67. Clive Schofield, What’s at Stake in the South China Sea? Geographical and 
Geopolitical Considerations, in BEYOND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note 3, at 11, 39. 
 68. Robin R. Churchill, The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 24, 29–30 (Donald R. Rothwell 
et al. eds., 2015). 
 69. Bundy, supra note 6, at 39. 
 70. Vasco Becker-Weinberg, Seabed Activities and the Protection and 
Preservation of the Marine Environment in Disputed Maritime Areas of the Asia-Pacific 
Region, 2012 L. OF THE SEA INST. 1, 2, www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Becker-Weinberg-
final.pdf. 
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follow the course of the maritime boundary dividing the jurisdiction of 
States, but rather is placed in such a way that it can be exploited from 
either side of the line. Regardless of this, certain broadly formulated 
provisions in the Convention might be applicable in the two earlier 
sketched scenarios: that is, when an oil and gas field is either found 
straddling an established boundary or located in an area that is subject to 
the overlapping claims of States.  
Regularly, oil and gas resources play an important role in disputed 
maritime areas: there might be proven reservoirs or rumors that parts of 
the disputed area contain resources; if there is an underlying dispute 
concerning sovereignty over islands,71 the connection between oil and 
gas and delimitation has been assumed to be even more apparent.72 
Reflecting the importance that States attach to oil and gas resources is the 
large aggregate of maritime areas where no maritime boundary has been 
established and where at least one of the reasons inhibiting their final 
delimitation is the issue of gaining access to natural resources.73 Under 
international law, States are offered a variety of instruments that enable 
them to deal with issues involving offshore oil and gas resources, one of 
which is to make attempts at coming to delimitation.74 The presence of 
resources, real or rumored, often motivates States to take a greater 
interest in a maritime area of overlapping claims and its delimitation.75 
Disputed continental shelves have sometimes paralyzed the exploration 
and exploitation of oil and gas resources that are locked away therein; 
their presence can create a situation that is less than amendable to 
diplomatic compromise.76 However, new discoveries have sometimes 
actually had the opposite effect, by expediting an agreement on a final 
  
 71. See generally Youri van Logchem, Exploration and Exploitation of Oil and 
Gas Resources in Maritime Areas of Overlap Under International Law: The Falklands 
(Malvinas), 28 HAGUE Y.B. INT’L L. 29 (2017). 
 72. See Loja, supra note 30, at 907. 
 73. John W. Donaldson, Oil and Water: Assessing the Link between Maritime 
Boundary Delimitation and Hydrocarbon Resources, in THE LIMITS, supra note 14, at 
127, 138–40. 
 74. See supra Part II.  
 75. See JAN KLABBERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW 246 (1st ed. 2013). 
 76. Blake & Swarbrick, supra note 1, at 4 (“[E]xploration may be delayed over a 
considerable area in and around the disputed seabed or territory.”). See also Robson, 
supra note 9, at 3. 
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maritime boundary.77 Mostly, if oil and gas resources are absent, there 
may be little incentive for coastal States to embark on negotiations on 
delimiting their overlapping entitlements, since these exercises can be 
complex, may take a long time and involve considerable costs for the 
States involved.78 
B. Overlapping EEZ and Continental Shelf Entitlements 
In certain parts of the seas of the world, the expansion of coastal 
States’ maritime jurisdiction lead to conflicting claims over the same 
maritime area up to 200 nm.79 In these situations, the proximity of the 
respective coasts inevitably resulted in overlapping entitlements of 
different coastal States to the same EEZ or continental shelf.80 Estimates, 
although there is a significant measure of variation between them, place 
the number of open maritime boundaries at around 200.81 Counting 
exercises of this nature generally go up to the 200 nm limit; hence, any 
overlapping claims States may have regarding extended continental 
shelves is omitted from these equations.82 Leaving the issue of the 
extended continental shelf further aside here, attention will be directed at 
the frequently occurring overlapping claims between coastal States over 
the same EEZ or continental shelf.  
  
 77. See John A. Sullivan, Attorney: Expect More Maritime Disputes With Deep 
Offshore E&P, NAT. GAS WK., Nov. 2, 2009, at 3 (“As more nations find oil and natural 
gas off their shores, except more disputes over where their territory ends and their 
neighbor’s begins.”). 
 78. See Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 209–10. 
 79. See CHURCHILL & LOWE, supra note 60, at 147–148; Anderson & Van 
Logchem, supra note 11, at 192–195. 
 80. See Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 192–195; Clive H. 
Schofield, The El Dorado Effect: Reappraising the ‘Oil Factor’ in Maritime Boundary 
Disputes, in THE LIMITS, supra note 14, at 114–115. 
 81. See Donaldson, supra note 73, at 134; Jan Paulson, Boundary Disputes into 
the Twenty-First Century: Why, How . . . and Who?, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 122, 
123 (2001); Tim Martin, Energy and International Boundaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY 181, 181 (Kim Talus ed., 2014). 
 82. Clive Schofield, Even More Lines in the Sea: Advances in the Spatial 
Governance of Marine Space, in OCEAN LAW AND POLICY: 20 YEARS UNDER UNCLOS 
387, 399 (Carlos Espósito et al. eds., 2016). 
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1.  Delimitation  
Distances between the mainland and island coasts of States are often 
not wide enough for an individual State to be able to claim its full 
entitlements to the EEZ or continental shelf, without creating an overlap 
with another State’s similar entitlements.83 Negotiations and referring a 
question over the maritime boundary to arbitral or judicial proceedings 
are two ways in which outstanding maritime boundary issues, including 
the issue of delimitation, can be resolved.84 However, embarking on 
either of these routes will require the consent of the States concerned.85  
Rules governing the delimitation of States’ overlapping EEZs and 
continental shelves are found in the similarly phrased provisions of 
paragraph 1 of Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC: these provide that an 
equitable solution to the delimitation question has to be achieved, based 
on international law. The contents of this common paragraph 1 have been 
critically received and a regularly heard criticism is that they are largely 
devoid of substance.86 To a certain extent, its contents have been clarified 
in the case law of international courts and tribunals, where historically 
maritime boundary questions have occupied a prominent place; how the 
courts and tribunals have gone about effecting delimitations is described 
extensively elsewhere and will therefore be not elaborated on here.87  
  
 83. See, e.g., Hussein M. Al Baharna, Legal Implications of Maritime Boundary 
Disputes (with Special Reference to the Gulf), 68 Y.B. OF ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 68, 70 
(1994); Suk Kyoon Kim, Understanding Maritime Disputes in Northeast Asia: Issues and 
Nature, 23 INT’L J. MARINE & COASTAL L. 214, 215 (2008). Maritime areas of 
overlapping claims exist virtually everywhere in the world. Baharna, supra, at 70. A 
region that has a many outstanding disputed areas is Northeast Asia. Kim, supra, at 215. 
 84. See, e.g., Tullio Treves, A System for Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement, in 
THE LAW OF THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 417, 417–18 (David Freestone et al. 
eds., 2006). 
 85. See David Anderson, Negotiating Maritime Boundary Agreements: A 
Personal View, in MARITIME DELIMITATION 121, 122–23 (Rainer Lagoni & Daniel 
Vignes eds., 2006). 
 86. See Malcolm D. Evans, Maritime Delimitation after Denmark v. Norway: 
Back to the Future?, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN 
BROWNLIE 153, 156–57 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999); Chris 
Whomersley, The South China Sea: The Award of the Tribunal in the Case Brought by 
Philippines against China—A Critique, 15 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 239, 249 (2016). 
 87. See generally Shi Jiuyong, Maritime Delimitation in the Jurisprudence of the 
International Court of Justice, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 271 (2010); See generally David H. 
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Once delimitation of a maritime area that is subject to the overlapping 
claims of at least two States has been effected—removing the previously 
existing overlap of sovereign rights—there is a single coastal State that 
has sovereign rights over living and nonliving resources of the EEZ or 
continental shelf.88 Coming to delimitation has a number of advantages 
for coastal States.89 For example, it prevents controversy or may alleviate 
previously arisen or continuing conflicts that are created by the absence 
of a maritime boundary.90 After the maritime boundary has been set, it 
will be clear for the States concerned, as well as the petroleum industry, 
as to where they may conduct work.91 However, issues might still arise if 
acts that have transboundary effects, including seismic work and drilling, 
commence very close to the final boundary line.92 In the absence of 
delimitation, overlapping maritime boundary claims might have a 
number of detrimental effects: first, States can experience difficulties in 
engaging foreign participation from the petroleum industry;93 and, 
second, commencing with activities concerning oil and gas resources 
contained within a disputed area can engender varying measures of 
discord between claimants, ranging from the exchange of diplomatic 
notes to sending naval vessels to the area in order to protect their own 
interest and prevent the other State from pursuing activities in the area.94  
  
Anderson, Recent Judicial Decisions Concerning Maritime Delimitation, in LAW OF THE 
SEA, FROM GROTIUS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA 495 
(Lilian del Castillo ed., 2015) [hereinafter LAW OF THE SEA, LIBER AMICORUM]. 
 88. See Enrico Milano & Irini Papanicolopulu, State Responsibility in Disputed 
Areas on Land and at Sea, HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 587, 589–590 (2011). 
 89. See Peter Cozens, Some Reflections on Maritime Boundary and Territorial 
Disputes in the Asia-Pacific with a Focus on the South China Sea, in THE BEST OF TIMES, 
THE WORST OF TIMES: MARITIME SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC 111, 116 (Joshua Ho & 
Catherine Z. Raymond eds., 2005). 
 90. See Donaldson, supra note 73, at 130; Lowell Bautista, Dispute Settlement in 
the Law of the Sea Convention and Territorial and Maritime Disputes in Southeast Asia: 
Issues, Opportunities, and Challenges, 6 ASIAN POL. & POL’Y 375, 392 (2014). 
 91. DAVID ANDERSON, MODERN LAW OF THE SEA: SELECTED ESSAYS 382 (2008). 
 92. See, e.g., Clive Schofield, Parting the Waves: Claims to Maritime 
Jurisdiction and the Division of Ocean Space, 1 PENN ST. J. L. & INT’L AFF. 58 (2012). 
 93. Leszek Buszynski & Iskander Sazlan, Maritime Claims and Energy 
Cooperation in the South China Sea, 29 CONTEMP. S.E. ASIA 143, 166 (2007). 
 94. For instance, after that the South Korean oil company Daewoo, operating 
solely under a license of Myanmar, sought to initiate drilling operation within a disputed 
area, Bangladesh condemned this unilateral move of Myanmar by protesting via 
diplomatic channels and deploying three of its navy vessels to the area. See, e.g., Jared 
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Coming back to the first detrimental effect that the absence of 
delimitation might have: there may be little desire for a petroleum 
company to align itself with one claimant State. It is well known that 
significant investments need to be made by the petroleum industry in 
order to be able to commence with work related to oil and gas 
resources.95 However, these investments can be put at risk or may be lost 
due to the characteristics of a disputed maritime area to which at least 
two different States have entitlements and each claims to have 
sovereignty or jurisdiction over:96 each State will claim to have an 
exclusive say over the engagement in activities in connection with oil 
and gas resources that are found in such an area.97 Effectively, a 
company might lose its investment if the other State (i.e., the one it did 
not obtain a license from) turns out to have sovereignty or jurisdiction 
over the area that is covered by the license. Importantly, these 
characteristics force the industry to depart from their usual modus 
operandi, that is, to obtain the exclusive right from a coastal State to 
extract hydrocarbons from delimited continental shelf areas where it is 
clear which coastal State has sovereign rights over the continental shelf 
and its resources.98 
  
Bissinger, The Maritime Boundary Dispute between Bangladesh and Myanmar: 
Motivations, Potential Solutions, and Implications, 10 ASIA POL’Y 103, 109 (2010). 
 95. Corazón Morales Siddayao, Oil and Gas on the Continental Shelf: Potentials 
and Constraints in the Asia-Pacific Region, 9 OCEAN MGMT 73, 84-85 (1984). 
In 1976 … an offshore rig of average complexity was reported to 
cost from US$20,000 to US$35,000 a day, an exploration 
offshore well in Burma was reported to cost around $5 million. 
More recent offshore drilling costs indicate that drilling and 
completion of one well would currently cost at least twice the 
1976 figure. 
Id. at 84. 
 96. See George Burn, et al., Legal Issues in Cross-Border Resource 
Development, 8 J. OF WORLD ENERGY L. & BUS. 154, 167 (2015); WU SHICUN, SOLVING 
DISPUTES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
160 (2013); Bekker, supra note 43, at 10. 
 97. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 198. 
 98. Carl W. Dundas, The Impact of Maritime Boundary Delimitation on the 
Development of Offshore Mineral Deposits, 20 RESOURCES POL’Y 273, 273 (1994). 
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2.  The Nature of Co-Existing Sets of Rights of States  
Achieving final delimitation of overlapping claims of States is 
regularly preceded by the elapsing of a long period of time.99 In certain 
localities, the effecting of a delimitation may be an altogether unlikely 
prospect. For instance, chances are slim that current outstanding disputes 
in the China Seas or the Aegean Sea will be settled quickly.100 
Historically, the measure of progress on the matter of delimitation of the 
maritime boundary in these localities has been minimal or even 
nonexistent.101 The nature of the overlap that arises between States’ 
claims in relation to EEZs and continental shelves is that there are 
multiple sets of sovereign rights that relate to the same geographical 
space, as well as any offshore resources contained therein.102 The effect 
of such coexisting sets of rights is that, usually, claimant States consider 
unilateral undertakings in connection with oil and gas that is contained in 
undelimited continental shelves to be their exclusive prerogative.103 In 
practice, States will vocalize such a position fairly regularly.104 Given 
that claimants will operate from this assumption, the potential for 
controversy emerging between them is readily apparent in the case that 
one of them decides to act on the conviction that the oil and gas 
resources contained in the disputed maritime area belong to it 
exclusively. At the outset, it must be recognized that making a start with 
exploitation of oil and gas in a disputed area is difficult to reconcile with 
the inherency of sovereign rights over the seabed of the States involved. 
This view has in part evolved out of the case law that grounded the 
  
 99. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 210. 
 100. See, e.g., Guifang (Julia) Xue and Lei Zhang, Maritime Disputes in Northeast 
Asia and Escalation of the Sino-Japan Islands Dispute: Implications and Prospects, 35 
U. Haw. L. Rev. 459, 483–484 (2013). 
 101. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 210. 
 102. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 198. 
 103. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 198. 
 104. See, e.g., Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the U.N., 
Note Verbale to the U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. CML/17/2009 (May 7, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys
_vnm_e.pdf; Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the U.N., Note 
Verbale to the U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. CML/18/2009 (May 7, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/vnm37_09/vnm_re_chn_2009re
_vnm.pdf.  
2018] The Status of a Rule of Capture Under International Law 215 
principle of the continental shelf being ipso facto and ab initio attached 
to the coastal State.105 The main implication of this is that a coastal State 
does not have to proclaim a continental shelf in order to have one: it 
exists, according to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), by virtue of 
the fact that the continental shelf is a physical continuation of a State’s 
land territory.106 Appertaining automatically to the coastal State, the 
continental shelf and all the oil and gas resources that are embedded 
within it belong equally to that State in the sense that it has the sovereign 
rights to engage in their exploitation.107 Its application rests on the view 
that when a field containing oil and gas is located in a disputed area that 
is subject to the claims of different coastal States, the nature of the rights 
they have over the continental shelf entail that no one claimant can 
undertake unilateral activities in this regard without harming another 
State’s rights that are of equal strength, validity, and substance.108 
III. OIL AND GAS RESOURCES STRADDLING AN ESTABLISHED MARITIME 
BOUNDARY 
Due to their chemical composition, oil and gas resources do not 
respect the regularities of a maritime boundary; in fact, coastal States 
may be able to exploit the same reservoir from either side of an 
established boundary. A progression by coastal State A to the stage of 
drilling into the reservoir will lead away the oil and gas resources in the 
area— including those that are on the side of coastal State B—to the 
point where the reservoir is pierced by the drilled well of State A. 
Attempts that were made to deal with this issue on a global level by 
establishing universal norms have all ended in failure.109 Particularly 
relevant in this regard were the efforts made by the International Law 
Commission, which, after compiling the views and State practice, 
  
 105. North Sea Continental Shelf, (Ger./Den; Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J 
Rep. 3, ¶ 19 (Feb. 20) (“[T]he rights of the coastal State in respect of the area of the 
continental shelf that constitutes a natural prolongation of its land territory into and under 
the sea exist ipso facto and ab initio, by virtue of its sovereignty over the land . . . .”). 
 106. Id. 
 107. LOSC, supra note 25, art. 77. 
 108. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 198; Miyoshi, supra note 4, at 
6, 10. 
 109. See Int’l. Law Comm’n., Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-Second Session, ¶ 
382, U.N. Doc. A/65/10 (2010). 
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concluded that this was overwhelmingly a bilateral affair and a highly 
political one carrying with it varying levels of technical difficulties in 
particular localities.110 Also, there is no provision in the LOSC that was 
directly written with a view to deal with oil and gas resources that 
straddle an established maritime boundary. Paragraph 3 of Articles 74 
and 83 of the Convention111 has, however, been wrongly invoked as the 
general norm that is applicable in situations where existing oil and gas 
resources cross a settled maritime boundary line.112  
There is a continuously expanding practice by States that addresses 
situations of overlapping claims by agreeing to a final maritime 
boundary.113 In terms of numbers, about 10% of these concluded 
delimitation agreements contain a conjoining provision that seeks to deal 
with straddling oil and gas resources.114 Saudi Arabia and Bahrain were 
the first to bring about a measure of cooperation concerning mineral 
resources straddling their established maritime boundary.115 The 
modalities of this agreement were as follows: the States concerned 
agreed to jointly develop an area that was rich in hydrocarbons that was 
completely located on the continental shelf of Saudi Arabia.116  
Other existing agreements approach the issues arising out of the 
presence of straddling oil and gas resources differently: some of them 
will put emphasis on preserving the unity of the deposit,117 whereas 
  
 110. Oral Rep. of the Working Group on Shared Nat. Res., U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SR.3069, at 12–13 (2010). 
 111. See infra Part V. 
 112. Cameron, supra note 8, at 564 (“It simply imposes a general obligation to 
cooperate when a deposit is found to cross boundary lines which are already delimited (or 
are situated in an area that is subject to overlapping claims).”). 
 113. Tuillo Treves, Maritime Delimitation and Offshore Features, in SOUTH 
CHINA SEA DISPUTES AND LAW OF THE SEA, supra note 11, at 121, 121–22. 
 114. See Anderson, supra note 85, at 138. See generally Nigel Bankes, Recent 
Framework Agreements for the Recognition and Development of Transboundary 
Hydrocarbon Resources, in ENERGY FROM THE SEA 106, 106–14 (Nigel Bankes & Seline 
Trevisanut eds., 2015). 
 115. RONGXING GUO, CROSS-BORDER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 221 (2d ed. 2012).  
 116. Bahrain–Saudia Arabia, in 2 INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BOUNDARIES 1489, 
1489–97 (Jonathan. I. Charney & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1993) (discussing 
considerations related to the Agreement and providing the text of the Bahrain-Saudi 
Arabia Boundary Agreement Dated 22 February 1958). 
 117. See Agreement Between the Government of the State of Israel and the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic 
 
2018] The Status of a Rule of Capture Under International Law 217 
others will lay down a framework concerning the actual use of a 
deposit.118 Given that the majority of delimitation agreements are silent 
on this issue,119 problems may emerge if a shared field is discovered after 
final delimitation. Upon the discovery of deposits that are transboundary 
in nature and when the existing delimitation agreement does not address 
the issue—if it does, the specific agreement will provide the relevant 
rules of reference—each of the States concerned has sovereign rights to 
develop the newly identified deposit.120 Of course, States could remedy 
this omission in the delimitation agreement by agreeing to an ad hoc 
unitization agreement afterwards. Unitization is a method that is 
commonly employed by neighboring States in order to share oil and gas 
resources that straddle a maritime boundary between their respective 
concessionaires.121 It involves bringing holders of concessions from the 
different coastal States together in relation to an oil field that can be 
exploited from either side of the boundary line.122 This concept can be 
seen as the opposite of the rule of capture.123 For instance, the countries 
bordering the North Sea have successfully managed to completely 
  
Zone, Isr.-Cyprus, Dec. 17, 2010, 2740 U.N.T.S. 55; Agreement Between the 
Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the 
Government of the Kingdom of Norway Relating to the Delimitation of the Continental 
Shelf between the Two Countries, Mar. 10, 1965, Gr. Brit..-Nor., GR. BRIT. TS NO. 71 
(1965) (Cd. 2757). 
 118. See Framework Agreement Between the United Kingdom and Norway, Apr. 
4, 2005, Gr. Brit.-Nor., GR. BRIT. TS NO. 20 (2007) (Cd. 7206); Treaty Between the 
Kingdom of Norway and the Russian Federation Concerning Maritime Delimitation and 
Cooperation in the Barents Sea and the Arctic Ocean, Nor.-Russ., Sep. 15, 2010, 50 
I.L.M. 1113. 
 119. Nigel Bankes, The Regime for Transboundary Hydrocarbon Deposits in the 
Maritime Delimitation Treaties and Other Related Agreements of Arctic Coastal States, 
47 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 141, 144 (2016). 
 120. See, Loja, supra note 30, at 897–98. 
 121. Int’l Law Ass’n, Int’l Comm. on the Exclusive Econ. Zone, supra note 46, at 
512; Bankes, supra note 114, at 117–22. 
 122. See, e.g., Yusuf Mohammad Yusuf, Is Joint Development a Panacea for 
Maritime Boundary Disputes and for the Exploitation of Offshore Transboundary 
Petroleum Deposits, 4 INT’L ENERGY L. REV. 130 (2009).  
 123. See Miyoshi, supra note 4, at 5–6; Morris, supra note 8, at 210; Cameron, 
supra note 8, at 570–71; Roughton, supra note 3, at 389. 
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delimit this area.124 Regularly, these agreed final boundary agreements 
have been conjoined by the making of provision for cross-border oil and 
gas fields that have yet to be, or already have been, discovered.125 The 
gist of these agreements is that oil and gas deposits straddling the 
boundary are to be jointly developed. Examples are the ones concluded 
between the Netherlands and the United Kingdom over the Markham 
Field126 and the United Kingdom and Norway concerning the Frigg 
Field.127 
Opinions in the legal literature are divided on the issue whether one 
State can start with the production from its side of the line regardless of 
the effects this will have on the oil and gas resources that are located on 
the other side of the boundary.128 In the absence of a unitization 
agreement, however, if one of the coastal States started development 
from its own side of the boundary, then, inevitably, another coastal 
State’s sovereign rights over the deposit would be negatively affected.129 
Arguing against the applicability of the rule of capture is a general 
principle of international law—as stated in the Latin maxim sic utere tuo, 
ut alienum non leaedas—prescribing that States have to behave as good 
neighbours. The ICJ found a specification of this principle (as expressed 
in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion,130 and having received further 
  
 124. See James E. Horigan, Unization of Petroleum Reservoirs Extending Across 
Sub-Sea Boundary Lines of Bordering States in the North Sea, 7 N. RES. LAWYER 67 
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 125. See, e.g., Donaldson, supra note 73, at 141–42. 
 126. Agreement Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
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1098 U.N.T.S. 4. 
 128. Compare Bundy, supra note 6, at 24 (arguing in support of rule of capture), 
with Miyoshi, supra note 4, at 6 (arguing against rule of capture). 
 129. Compare Miyoshi, supra note 4, at 10 (contending sovereign rights are 
negatively affected in the absence of unitization agreement), with Loja, supra note 30, at 
910 (contending that sovereign rights principles are not adhered to in the context of 
activities on the continental shelf). 
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I.C.J. Rep. 226, ¶ 229 (July 8). 
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endorsements in the Gabčikovo/Nagymaros131 and Pulp Mills cases)132 to 
exist in the form of a rule of customary law that imposes on States an 
obligation to ensure that activities under one’s own jurisdiction and 
control must respect the areas that are under the jurisdiction of other 
States and the environment in general.133 Translated to the context of oil 
and gas resources that straddle a maritime boundary, this good 
neighbourliness would thus require that States abstain from conducting 
oil and gas operations from areas under their jurisdiction that will affect 
the continental shelf area of another coastal State. Given that the 
development of a straddling reservoir from the side of State A of the 
boundary will result in a loss of the amount of oil and gas that was prior 
to the development located on the side of State B—amounting, amongst 
others, to a loss of revenue for State B—the principle of good-
neighborliness is difficult to align with the premise of the rule of capture, 
which effectively favors development above respecting another State’s 
continental shelf rights to its resources.  
IV. OIL AND GAS RESOURCES IN DISPUTED EEZS AND CONTINENTAL 
SHELVES 
Attention will now be directed to those oil and gas fields that are 
located in areas where the maritime boundary remains undetermined, 
accompanied by a discussion of the specific issues that they present. 
Disputed maritime areas that are said to hold large quantities of oil and 
gas resources are to be found in the East China Sea,134 the South China 
Sea,135 and the Arctic.136 Activities that are unilaterally undertaken in 
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connection with oil and gas will regularly lead to incidents between 
claimant States. The exacerbation of a dispute over the maritime 
boundary, whether short or long lived, is almost invariably to follow; in 
turn, chances of successfully achieving final delimitation are negatively 
affected.137 In particular disputed maritime areas, coastal States are 
apparently increasing the level of unilaterally undertaken activities 
regarding oil and gas.138 This may give some cause for concern, 
particularly because such tendencies have also been observed in areas 
that have a long history of serious difficulties arising over unilateral 
undertakings, including in the South China Sea.139 
At one end of the spectrum, a moratorium was suggested that imposes 
a ban on all acts related to oil and gas as long as a final maritime 
boundary is absent.140 Pursuant to this option, the moratorium on 
undertaking activities concerning these offshore resources can only be 
lifted when all claimants agree.141 Bringing about cooperation between 
claimants was thus elevated to a precondition so oil and gas related 
activities could commence; the extent to which such activities could be 
pursued would depend on the terms of this subsequent agreement. 
During the Third Law of the Sea Conference, Ireland and Papua New 
Guinea were amongst the States that premised commencing with 
activities in relation to oil and gas resources in disputed areas on the 
condition that the States concerned had concluded an agreement; 
otherwise a blanket ban would be imposed on such areas concerning oil 
  
 136. OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE 
NO. 66, HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE NO. 25 (2009), 
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Development Activities in the Disputed South China Sea/Spratly Area: A Role that 
Taiwan Can Play, 39 OCEAN DEV. & INT’L L. 150, 151 (2008). 
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3. Pending agreement or settlement, the States concerned shall, either 
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11, at 200. 
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and gas related activity.142 Suggestions seeking to introduce moratoria 
could count on a critical reception from the majority of States in the 
Third Law of the Sea Conference;143 their prime concern was that 
imposing a moratorium carried with it huge economic implications.144 
Despite the fact that the concept of a moratorium, or hints at its 
introduction, engendered significant measures of criticism, less 
controversy surrounded the thought that certain unilateral acts would 
carry with them reduced chances of coming to a final delimitation 
agreement.145  
The rule of capture can be placed at the other end of the spectrum. 
Tailored to disputed areas, the implication is that each claimant State 
would be able to start drilling and exploiting a reservoir without another 
claimant’s consent. Between these two extremes there are middle ways, 
in that some acts taken in relation to oil and gas resources are 
permissible, whereas others have to be eschewed in a situation where no 
maritime boundary has been established; this latter approach has been 
subsequently adopted by international courts and tribunals.146  
At the Third Law of the Sea Conference, some States did not focus on 
bringing about a division by identifying permissible and impermissible 
activities. Rather, they sought to alleviate any problems that might arise 
due to an overlap of States’ claims by creating a division of the maritime 
area of overlapping claims by means of a provisional geographic line—
i.e., the median or equidistance line.147 In the context of the maritime 
boundary dispute between China and Japan, and after reviewing the case 
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law of international courts and tribunals concerning maritime 
delimitation—wherein a pattern has emerged that a court or tribunal will 
first establish an equidistance line in order to subsequently assess 
relevant circumstances that may legitimize its revision—Tas argued that 
this solution can be equally transposed to the period preceding 
delimitation.148 This argument is not convincing for a number of reasons: 
first, it conflates between the use of a provisional equidistance line in the 
determination of the course of a final maritime boundary and the role it 
fulfills as a temporary solution; and second, it brushes over the fact that 
the relevant provision that applies in areas of overlapping EEZs and 
continental shelves—paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC, 
which will be discussed next—is silent on the use of an equidistance line 
prior to delimitation.  
V. PARAGRAPH 3 OF ARTICLES 74 AND 83 OF THE LOSC149 
Underlying the introduction of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 into 
the framework of the LOSC was the recognition of its drafters that some 
rules had to be developed in relation to areas of overlapping EEZ and 
continental shelf claims that would be applicable prior to their 
delimitation.150 This thought can be traced back to the early stages of the 
Third Law of the Sea Conference151 and eventually translated into the 
compromissory text of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC.152 
One division amongst some of the States at this Conference was 
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concerning the objective that an interim rule should fulfill pending 
delimitation: was it to prescribe on claimant States an obligation to seek 
cooperation in relation to the disputed area or was the way forward to 
have a provisional line, drawn on the basis of equidistance, forming the 
outer limit up to which claimants could exercise jurisdiction prior to final 
delimitation? The current language of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 
of the Convention was borne out of this division of views on how to 
approach the situation preceding coming to EEZ or continental shelf 
delimitation.  
Paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 employ an identical formulation of 
what is required of claimant States pending the delimitation of 
overlapping EEZs and continental shelves by placing them under two 
obligations: to motivate States to come to a mutual understanding on 
how to deal with a maritime area that is subject to overlapping claims 
and to prevent activities from commencing that will be prejudicial to 
final delimitation.153 The relationship between the two obligations 
contained therein can, according to the Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname, 
be phrased as follows: both obligations contained within paragraph 3 of 
Articles 74 and 83 are separate and can be breached independently of 
each other.154 Both have, according to the Tribunal, a good faith 
component attached, requiring States to make every effort to negotiate on 
provisional arrangements and to not take a unilateral step that has an 
effect of hampering or jeopardizing final delimitation.155 Paragraphs 3 of 
Articles 74 and 83 apply to those activities that are conducted by, or 
conducted under the authority of, claimant coastal States and applies to 
activities over which they may conjointly exercise jurisdiction. In view 
of their open-endedness, oil and gas related activities fall within the 
sphere of operation of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the 
Convention, although to what extent remains doubtful. The implications 
of paragraphs 3 for claimant States that are seeking to engage in oil and 
gas activities within a disputed EEZ or continental shelf is twofold: first, 
the States concerned have to exert a given measure of effort to find 
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temporary cooperative means concerning oil and gas resources.156 
Second, they have to abstain from conduct in connection with such 
resources that may hamper or jeopardize the chances of coming to a final 
delimitation agreement.157 These aspects will be elaborated on in turn in 
the next two subsections.158  
The contents of the obligations under paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 
83 of the Convention are not easily established: the provisions contain a 
number of elements that create some interpretational difficulties and 
activities that may hamper or jeopardize are not further elaborated on.159 
Judicial pronouncements clarifying the meaning of paragraph 3 of 
Articles 74 and 83 are very few: as things currently stand, the most 
significant elaboration is encountered in the case between Guyana and 
Suriname.160 After the emplacement by Guyana of an oil rig within a 
disputed area, with the aim of commencing with exploratory drilling, the 
other claimant—Suriname—sought to put a halt to this conduct by 
sending its naval vessels.161 This reaction provided the reason for Guyana 
to take the dispute over the maritime boundary to arbitral proceedings.162 
Both States contended that the other had acted in contravention of the 
obligations included in paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the 
Convention.163 In Guyana v. Suriname, the Tribunal—for the greater part 
building on earlier pronouncements of the ICJ in the Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf case164 and the North Sea Continental Shelf cases165—
specified two elements: first, to some degree,166 what scope there is for 
unilateralism in disputed maritime areas, by identifying particular oil and 
gas related activities as hampering or jeopardizing a final agreement; 
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and, second, the efforts that claimants have to make in order to 
successfully arrive at cooperative schemes.167 This case law suggests that 
the negative obligation to not jeopardize or hamper reaching a final 
agreement should not be interpreted as to eliminate all room for 
claimants to engage in oil and gas related conduct.168 For an activity to be 
placed within the prohibited category, it must exceed the following 
threshold: irreparable effects to a State’s rights must be caused or the 
marine environment must be permanently damaged in consequence.169  
A. The Obligation to Exert Efforts to Come to Provisional 
Arrangements 
The first component of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the 
LOSC seeks to induce claimant coastal States to successfully set up 
cooperative measures covering the disputed area.170 It seeks to achieve 
this by obligating claimant States to make every effort to enter into some 
kind of provisional arrangements of a practical nature.171 The 
terminology used in State practice to refer to cooperative understandings 
concluded pursuant to paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the 
Convention lacks uniformity: arrangements and agreements are two 
examples of terms that are used.172 Whatever the terminology, these 
agreements commonly cover situations where States with overlapping 
entitlements to the same maritime area agree to cooperate in the period 
before there is a settled boundary dividing their jurisdictions.173 More 
specifically, arrangements concluded pursuant to this paragraph 3 will 
apply in the period when a final delimitation agreement on the 
overlapping EEZ or continental shelf is pending or awaited.174  
The first sentence of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC 
references the fact that States that are faced with overlapping EEZ and 
  
 167. Kamal Hossain, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and 
Provisional Arrangements Relating to Activities in Disputed Maritime Areas, in LAW OF 
THE SEA, LIBER AMICORUM, supra note 87, at 674, 678. 
 168. Guyana/Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A ¶ 465. 
 169. Id. ¶ 467–68. 
 170. See Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 206.  
 171. LOSC, supra note 25, arts. 74.3, 83.3. 
 172. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 212–15.  
 173. See BRITISH INST. OF INT’L & COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 42, at 18. 
 174. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 11, at 208–09. 
226 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 26.2 
continental shelf claims are required to show a certain attitude in opened 
negotiations for provisional arrangements within the meaning of this 
paragraph; they have to conduct themselves in “in a spirit of 
understanding and co-operation.”175 The question that follows is to what 
extent claimants are implored to make such efforts: do they need to result 
in the successful setting up of a cooperative regime or is something less 
required, such as merely a sincere attempt at coming thereto? The scope 
of this obligation was addressed by the Tribunal in the case between 
Guyana and Suriname.176 In deciding on the contention advanced by both 
of the disputing parties that the other breached the obligation to negotiate 
on provisional arrangements, the Tribunal elaborated on this obligation 
in some detail.177 It started by stating that the positive obligation to make 
every effort to enter into provisional arrangements seeks to ensure that an 
effective use of marine resources is realized.178 Running as a thread 
through much of the considerations of the Tribunal is that, assuming the 
circumstances allow for it, cooperation concerning oil and gas should be 
brought about;179 coming to cooperation was found to be particularly 
prudent in order to “preserv[e] the unity of [the] deposit[].”180 Another 
key finding of the Tribunal, despite the emphasis it placed on the 
desirability of coming to a measure of cooperation, was that there is no 
hard obligation for claimants to successfully set up provisional 
arrangements; rather, the States concerned must enter into negotiations in 
good faith.181 The Tribunal largely replicated this point from the ICJ’s 
finding in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. Underscoring the 
importance of holding good faith negotiations, the ICJ found in this case 
that States are required to exert genuine efforts to arrive at cooperation 
under this obligation.182 The Tribunal went on to interpret the phrase of 
“in a spirit of understanding and cooperation” in a broad way by stating 
that it embodies an aspect of what the obligation to negotiate in good 
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faith requires of States that are faced with an overlap of entitlements over 
the same maritime area.183  
1. Joint Development of Oil and Gas Resources 
One example of a type of cooperation that can be brought within the 
meaning of provisional arrangements pursuant to paragraph 3 of Articles 
74 and 83 of the LOSC is joint development of oil and gas resources. It 
must however be emphasized that not all joint development agreements 
have been concluded with this common paragraph in mind; in fact, it 
may have not been at all guiding in their preparation.184 The concept of 
joint development is subject to some definitional difficulties.185 Some 
authors consider both agreements concerning oil and gas resources that 
are located in disputed areas and those that straddle an established 
maritime boundary to fall under one broad definition.186 For instance, 
Churchill defines these agreements as relating to “an area where two or 
more States have, under international law, sovereign rights to explore 
and exploit the natural resources of the area and where the States 
concerned have agreed to engage in such exploration and exploitation 
under some form of common or joint arrangement.”187 Under this view, 
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emphasis is placed on that it concerns coastal States which have, or claim 
to have, sovereign rights over a maritime area, and who agree to bundle 
these rights over an identified oil and gas deposit by setting up a 
cooperative scheme. Lagoni does not discriminate between oil and gas 
reservoirs that straddle a maritime boundary or that straddle an 
undelimited area by defining joint development as “the co-operation 
between States with regard to the exploration for and exploitation of 
certain deposits, fields or accumulations of non-living resources, which 
either extend across a boundary or lie in an area of overlapping 
claims.”188 Other commentators have emphasized the distinction between 
arrangements that have been agreed to in situations where a maritime 
boundary is either absent or present.189 
The first provisional understanding that related to oil and gas and 
involved an area of overlapping entitlements was the one agreed to 
between Japan and South Korea in the Yellow Sea in 1974.190 Despite 
Chinese protests, the primary reason for it having been abandoned since 
seems to have been the lack of exploratory success.191 Ever since, States 
have increasingly turned to means that enable them to cooperate in 
matters involving oil and gas that is located in disputed areas. In terms of 
numbers, around thirty formal192 provisional arrangements have been 
concluded between States whose maritime claims overlap;193 however, 
not all of these have brought oil and gas related activities within their 
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2018] The Status of a Rule of Capture Under International Law 229 
purview.194 Amongst this range of existing provisional arrangements, 
about twenty relate to oil and gas resources.195 The specifics of 
provisional arrangements are left to the decision of the States whose 
claims over the same EEZ and continental shelf overlap.196 A key 
principle attached to provisional arrangements is that they only apply res 
inter alios acta; hence, any rights and interests third States may have 
remain unaffected.197  
Negotiations over joint development, for instance concerning the joint 
management of an oil and gas field, can be as difficult as talks that aim at 
establishing a definitive maritime boundary: they can be lengthy, 
complex, and contentious, as well as of a highly technical nature.198 
Furthermore, in cases where joint development negotiations have 
succeeded199 political changes or changes in the political will may 
deprive agreed provisional arrangements of their usefulness.200  
Be this as it may, according to one commentator, there has been a 
rush amongst States to design cooperative modalities to allow for the 
development of oil and gas resources whenever they are contained within 
an area of overlapping maritime claims.201 Redgwell has phrased it more 
moderately by observing: “Joint development agreements are an 
increasingly common legal form for embedding state cooperation to 
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exploit a straddling field.”202 Due to the broadening practice of States to 
turn to cooperative means, consideration has to be given to what extent it 
is mandated under international law, for instance in the shape of a rule of 
customary law, to successfully come to cooperation regarding oil and gas 
resources that are located in disputed areas. Different views have been 
advanced on the matter of whether successfully setting up joint 
development schemes for hydrocarbons has the status of a rule of 
customary international law, ranging from that it has become such a rule 
to that it has not.203 Between these extremes, there is the view that a 
customary international rule may have been developed only in certain 
localities, particularly there where States have turned in great numbers to 
cooperative means; for instance, in the North Sea.204 However, State 
practice lacks uniformity concerning the extent that States have adopted 
cooperative means concerning oil and gas; currently, there are only a 
relatively small number of cooperative modalities seeking to deal with 
these resources in maritime areas that are unregulated by a maritime 
boundary.205 This, at least, puts into question whether there is a 
widespread practice of States that are faced with an overlap of their 
claims over the same maritime area. Further, coming to these cooperative 
endeavors must be borne out of a conviction on the part of the relevant 
States that international law does so prescribe, often stated in the Latin 
maxim opinio juris sive necessitatis. In this regard, it is interesting to 
note that a great number of the States that certainly meet the interest 
requirement, including those with coastal fronts on the South China Sea, 
Aegean Sea, and Mediterranean Sea, have been largely unable to 
successfully come to joint development of any oil and gas resources 
found in these localities.206 
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B.  The Obligation to Abstain from Certain Unilateral Acts 
The second component of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the 
LOSC is the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize, which is largely 
negative in nature. Its main aim is to avoid unilateral actions undertaken 
in connection with a maritime area that is subject to overlapping claims 
of two or more coastal States because these might have a detrimental 
effect on the chances that final delimitation is successfully achieved.207 
The obligation to not hamper or jeopardize in the context of oil and gas 
resources first seeks to put limitations on the scope to freely engage in 
associated conduct related thereto.208 Second, it influences the type of 
response that can be formulated by claimant State A who is faced with a 
unilateral act undertaken by claimant State B with regard to oil and gas 
resources that are located in a disputed EEZ or continental shelf.209 
Leaving the second aspect further aside, attention will be directed to the 
first effect of paragraph 3, to the extent that it limits the scope for 
unilateralism with regard to oil and gas related activities. The question 
arises to what extent the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize shackles 
a claimant State that seeks to engage in oil and gas related conduct. 
Whilst it is clear that this obligation seeks to prevent certain unilateral 
activities from commencing, less evident is what particular activities 
relating to oil and gas are caught under the reach of this obligation: does 
it seek to prevent them all from commencing, or does this vary with the 
type of activity involved? As to what these prohibited categories of 
actions are, the Tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname drew heavily, though 
with some variations, on the ICJ’s Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case. In 
the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case, the ICJ produced a list of 
unilateral acts that would have caused “irreparable prejudice” to another 
State’s rights and, a fortiori, would have given it sufficient reason to 
prescribe interim measures of protection in an order.210 Placing 
installations on or above the seabed, appropriating natural resources of 
the area of the continental shelf, and causing physical damage to the 
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seabed or subsoil or to any natural resources in the continental shelf were 
the three categories that brought about a severe enough mutation of a 
State’s right that warranted the giving of interim protection according to 
the ICJ.211 Coming back to the reasoning of the Tribunal in Guyana v. 
Suriname, it began by pointing out that the obligation to not hamper or 
jeopardize is a specific application of the general principle to settle 
disputes peacefully under international law.212 It went on to emphasize 
the undesirability of completely sterilizing the disputed maritime area 
from economic development: due to its economic implications, the 
solution of a moratorium has to be avoided to the greatest possible 
extent.213 Nonetheless, the Tribunal regarded it vital to prevent certain 
unilateral conduct from commencing: that is, those acts which would 
exert permanent effects on the marine environment.214  
1. Seismic Work  
Uncertainty may prevail over the true extent of oil and gas resources 
that are located in maritime areas of overlap;215 regularly, this is the 
direct result of the disputed status of an area, which can significantly 
complicate activities to proceed that seek to address this uncertainty. 
Some States have taken the position that the disputed status of an area of 
overlap precludes altogether that seismic work may commence. For 
example, areas that are subject to the overlapping claims of Cambodia 
and Thailand in the Gulf of Thailand remain unresearched as a 
  
 211. Id. 
 212. Guyana/Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. 1, Award of the Arbitral Tribunal, ¶ 465 
(Perm. Ct. Arb. Sept. 17, 2007). 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. ¶ 470.  
However, international courts and tribunals should also be careful 
not to stifle the parties’ ability to pursue economic development 
in a disputed area during a boundary dispute. . . . It is the 
Tribunal’s opinion that drawing a distinction between activities 
having a permanent physical impact on the marine environment 
and those that do not, accomplishes this and is consistent with 
other aspects of the law of the sea and international law. 
 215. Nick A. Owen & Clive H. Schofield, Disputed South China Sea 
Hydrocarbons in Perspective, 36 MARINE POL’Y 809, 809 (2012). 
2018] The Status of a Rule of Capture Under International Law 233 
consequence of such positions.216 In other localities, issuing licenses or 
concessions for oil and gas or other mineral activities by claimants, in 
respect of maritime areas where the boundary is disputed, including for 
seismic work, is fairly common.217 In certain instances in the past, the 
possibility of conducting seismic work in order to provide information 
over the extent to which petroleum resources are present within a 
disputed continental shelf area has been arguably aided in agreeing on a 
final delimitation agreement.218 However, this statement is certainly not 
universally true, particularly because there are a number of situations 
where the known presence of deposits had led States to become 
entrenched in their positions that final delimitation has to be effected in a 
particular way.219 The activation of an oil and gas license or the 
authorization of a seismic survey, may, and regularly does, ignite 
controversy between claimants, ranging from verbal spats to the sending 
of naval vessels to put a stop to an already initiated seismic surveying 
operation.220 The following is an example of a controversy which arose in 
the Bay of Bengal between Bangladesh and India that followed from a 
unilateral seismic operation in connection with oil and gas that was 
rumored to be located in a disputed maritime area.221 Bangladesh had 
almost consistently taken the position that all unilateral conduct of 
activities in relation to petroleum resources had to be postponed until 
agreement was reached on where the maritime boundary running 
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between the coasts of itself and India would be.222 A seismic vessel 
(CGG Symphony) equipped with the instruments to take a survey of the 
seabed, operated by a company incorporated in a third State (Australia) 
and licensed by India, operated in close proximity to the disputed South 
Talpatty/New Moore Island and was subsequently forced to put a halt to 
its planned operation by Bangladesh; in its wake a diplomatic 
controversy arose between Bangladesh and India.223  
Issues in connection with exploring for oil and gas resources in a 
disputed continental shelf emerged first in the Aegean Sea Continental 
Shelf case.224 Prior to the entering into force of the LOSC, Greece and 
Turkey became embroiled in a dispute over the conduct of seismic 
operations by Turkey in relation to the Aegean Sea continental shelf on 
two separate occasions.225 Against this backdrop, Greece felt compelled 
to bring this dispute to the ICJ and simultaneously to the United Nations 
Security Council.226 In the proceedings for interim protection, Greece 
took the position that its sovereign rights were irreversibly infringed 
upon through the unilateral seismic acts of Turkey.227 Greece took 
particular issue with the fact that this resulted in a knowledge advantage 
for Turkey as unilateral surveying would provide one claimant with more 
information over the composition of the disputed continental shelf.228 
Activities that are designed to obtain information of the continental shelf 
fell, according to Greece, in the category of activities that can only be 
conducted by the relevant coastal State to the detriment of any other 
State.229 In fact, Greece sought to convince the ICJ that there is no 
freedom for claimants to unilaterally gain information on the 
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composition of a disputed seabed.230 The ICJ struck down the contention 
presented by Greece that there is exclusivity for the coastal State to 
engage in information collecting activities that might have a practical 
application for oil and gas related activities.231 In applying the test of 
irreparable prejudice, the ICJ found that seismic exploration did not 
exceed this threshold.232 While admitting that a State’s rights would be 
somewhat prejudiced, the ICJ concluded that the extent of prejudice done 
could be repaired ex post facto by financial means in case the area in 
question would be brought under the jurisdiction of Greece after final 
delimitation.233 Another key aspect that was relevant for the decision 
over the lawfulness of the unilaterally undertaken seismic work was its 
fleetingness, which was exemplified in the following way: seismic work 
will only involve shooting seismic waves down at the seabed from a 
vessel, after completing this it will evict the disputed area.234 More 
specifically, the ICJ held that seismic work does not carry the “risk of 
physical damage to the seabed or subsoil,” considering that the work was 
only accompanied by a few small explosions that were set off by the 
seismic vessel in surveying the seabed.235 The acceptability of conducting 
unilateral seismic work was further confirmed by the Tribunal in Guyana 
v. Suriname, which held in largely the same terms as the ICJ that seismic 
work is allowed to unilaterally proceed.236  
2. Drilling 
It has been asserted that drilling could not realistically commence in 
disputed maritime areas, due to the unwillingness on the part of the 
petroleum industry to commit itself thereto.237 This has, however, not 
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proven to be an accurate reflection of what subsequent practice has 
evolved into because, not infrequently, some measure of drilling has 
proceeded with the approval of only one claimant State in disputed areas. 
For example, the emplacement of a number of drilling rigs to initiate 
drilling into disputed parts of the continental shelf in the South China Sea 
led to an outcry by Vietnam in 2014.238 Glancing over the legality of the 
act of positioning a number of rigs in this area, a Chinese official referred 
to the normality of moving drilling rigs into disputed maritime areas in 
order to commence operations there.239 Further, in a disputed part of the 
continental shelf of the Gulf of Thailand, Malaysia activated a 
concession held by one of its concessionaires (Hamilton), which drilled 
an exploratory well in March 1991 and subsequently generated a formal 
protest from Vietnam in 1992.240  
Drilling was also at the forefront of difficulties that arose between 
Guyana and Suriname. Guyana licensed an oil rig, which was operated 
by a company incorporated in a third State, to engage in drilling within 
the contested area.241 After the oil rig positioned itself in the disputed 
area, it was removed through efforts of the Surinam navy; this response 
and the specificities surrounding this removal were, however, heavily 
condemned by the Tribunal.242 Suriname contended that two acts 
committed by Guyana violated the negative obligation under paragraph 3 
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of Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC:243 first, its authorization to its 
concessionaire to conduct exploratory drilling in the disputed maritime 
area; and, second, the fact that the oil rig sought to commence drilling 
into the disputed continental shelf without the approval of Suriname.244 
In its pleadings, tailored to defending the lawfulness of the unilateral act 
of drilling, Guyana rarely went beyond replicating the terms of the 
reasoning as elucidated by the ICJ in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
case in order to substantiate its argument that surveying and drilling are 
two sides of the same coin.245 The main gist of Guyana’s argument was 
that the effects that follow from drilling into the continental shelf and 
surveying are comparable: both are activities of an inherently transitory 
character.246 In framing its argument, by using language that both acts 
were of a transitory nature, Guyana sought to bring drilling within the 
category of activities the ICJ earlier held to be insufficient reason to offer 
interim protection.247 However, the Tribunal struck down this contention: 
it held that drilling has to be distinguished from conducting seismic work 
since it exerts very different degrees of change.248 More specifically, 
drilling is a type of activity that would bring about irreversible effects on 
another claimant’s rights, as well as the marine environment,249 whereas 
seismic work was largely benign.250 Conversely, contrary to what 
Suriname claimed,251 the act of licensing a concessionaire to commence 
with drilling in a disputed area provided simpliciter insufficient reason 
for assuming that a breach had occurred.252 It was deemed of critical 
importance by the Tribunal that a unilateral act would engender one of 
the following two effects: creating a permanent change in the rights of 
another party to the dispute or having a physical and permanent impact 
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on the marine environment.253 In case an activity was to create one of 
these effects, it may only commence pursuant to the prior consent of all 
the claimants concerned.254 In applying this standard to exploratory 
drilling, the Tribunal concluded that this was an example of an activity 
that would result in permanent physical damage being done to the marine 
environment.255  
3. Exploitation of Natural Resources  
The ICJ classified exploitation or attempts at appropriating the natural 
resources of a disputed area of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf case as one of the activities that, if they were to 
commence, would justify giving an order containing interim measures of 
protection.256 Central to arriving at this conclusion were the following 
two considerations: first, the rights of States are threatened with 
irreparable prejudice; and, second, the seabed or subsoil is physically 
damaged as a consequence of exploitation.257 After the ICJ came to its 
decision in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf case and largely following 
its pronouncements on the illegality of the unilateral exploitation of oil 
and gas resources within a disputed maritime area, the view that 
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international law prohibits the unilateral development of oil and gas 
resources has been expressed in literature.258 Similarly, Lagoni concluded 
on the basis of this case that “the ‘actual appropriation or other use of the 
natural resources,’ would doubtless be prohibited under paragraph 3 of 
Articles 74/83.”259 Further reinforcing this view is the case between 
Guyana and Suriname because the argument of the Tribunal can 
effectively be read as a (further) renunciation of the existence of a rule of 
capture in disputed maritime areas under international law. Although the 
Tribunal stated that there is no obligation for States to agree to 
provisional arrangements pursuant to paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 
of the LOSC, developing oil and gas from a disputed area would have, 
nonetheless, to be preceded by agreeing to joint development or would 
have to be postponed until the maritime boundary question is 
conclusively resolved.260  
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS: (RE-)EVALUATING THE STATUS OF A RULE 
OF CAPTURE UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH REGARD TO OIL 
AND GAS RESOURCE RELATED ACTIVITIES AT SEA  
In view of the above assumptions as to whether a rule of capture 
could operate or is actually operating at sea—in the situations where a 
common oil and gas deposit is found straddling an established boundary 
or is located in a disputed maritime area—it is opportune to redefine its 
status under modern international law of the sea. To start, coastal States 
have the sovereign right to explore and exploit oil and gas resources in 
areas that are under their exclusive jurisdiction.261 Their freedom to 
engage in oil and gas related activities is, however, premised on two 
considerations: first, the outer limits of the maritime boundary constitute 
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the points up to which States can engage in such conduct; and, second, 
the activities undertaken on one’s own side of the maritime boundary 
may not have detrimental transboundary effects in that the rights and 
interests of the neighbor State(s) are harmed as a consequence. 
Difficulties brought out by straddling oil and gas deposits may emerge 
concerning this latter aspect: in short, commencing with drilling on the 
side of State A into a reservoir whose geological properties are such as to 
extend beyond a determined boundary will result in the consequential 
decrease of the oil and gas resources that are located on the part of the 
continental shelf of State B. At an increasing rate, States have either 
anticipated the arising of this problem by including a relevant provision 
in a final delimitation agreement or have upon their discovery concluded 
a separate unitization agreement to tackle the issue. This expanding 
practice of cooperative schemes that have been put in place feeds the 
suggestion that a rule of capture has been countermanded. There are two 
additional arguments that can be invoked against the alleged validity and 
applicability of the rule of capture to these straddling deposit type of 
situations: first, progressing to development will violate the sovereign 
rights a coastal State has in exploring and exploiting the continental 
shelf; and, second, one application of the principle of good 
neighborliness is that State A has to respect the areas belonging to State 
B under international law of the sea.  
Now, to turn to those localities where a maritime boundary is absent. 
At the outset, it must be recognized that moving to the stage of 
exploitation in a maritime area that is undelimited by way of a final 
boundary can carry with it a number of practical limitations. First of all, 
a discovered oil and gas field has, as recognized earlier,262 a lead-in time 
of approximately ten years before it is able to produce. In view of this 
duration, it is unlikely that claimant State B will remain in the dark over 
that State A took a drilled well into production; the amount of time 
required for a well to start producing provides State B with ample 
opportunity to detect such activities and to subsequently formulate a 
response showing its misgiving.263 Second, once State B learns thereof, it 
is almost sure to evoke its response, which can make the decision to 
physically prevent such activities from commencing by, for instance, 
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sending its naval vessels.264 Beyond these practical limitations, from the 
perspective of international law, the position that exploitation of oil and 
gas cannot commence unilaterally in disputed areas has a firm anchoring. 
Despite some examples from State practice that might suggest the pre-
eminency of the rule of capture, the position that unilateral development 
cannot commence in maritime areas of overlapping claims has received 
significant judicial approbation over the years. Both the Aegean Sea 
Continental Shelf case and Guyana v. Suriname make clear that a 
unilateral progression to the phase of development is unlawful: the 
unilateral development of offshore oil and gas resources is prohibited, as 
it results in the fact that a State’s rights are threatened with irreparable 
prejudice or that in consequence the seabed or subsoil or the marine 
environment is physically damaged.265 These findings of the ICJ and the 
Tribunal are virtually impossible to reconcile with the idea that a rule of 
capture could lawfully operate in disputed maritime areas. Whether 
States will observe the prohibition on the unilateral taking of oil and gas 
from such an area or will seek to disregard it for whatever reason is of 
course an altogether different matter, but any more or less sporadically 
emerging contrary practice cannot be interpreted as undermining the 
position that the rule of capture, as understood in its original sense, does 
not reflect the current state of international law in disputed maritime 
areas.  
This contribution has also sought to address whether there is a rule of 
largely similar import that sees to commencing with drilling and seismic 
work in a disputed area by employing a variation on how the rule of 
capture is traditionally understood—i.e., as being concerned with 
developing a straddling oil and gas field. As far as drilling is concerned, 
the pursued strand of enquiry was whether international law allows one 
claimant State to drill a well and put the generated information, generally 
through an analysis of a core sample, at its sole disposal. The same 
earlier identified case law of the ICJ and the Arbitral Tribunal both 
brought drilling under the range of unilateral activities that would be 
caught under the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize final 
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delimitation.266 In the literature, however, some voices have emerged that 
the Tribunal did not fully shut the door and that not all types of drilling 
would be captured under its dictum, such that drilling would not in 
general have to be eschewed pending delimitation.267 Giving cause for 
questioning the general unlawfulness of unilateral drilling in a disputed 
area is that the Tribunal made its pronouncements in the context of the 
gathering of core samples from the disputed continental shelf.268 The 
strength of this line of argument is questionable in view of the fact that 
the Tribunal seems to have focused on the impact an act of drilling 
would have on the marine environment as well on another claimant’s 
rights, which is unlikely to be very different when other types of drilling 
activity would be involved.269 However, the argument might be 
entertained that some measure of drilling, in the context of marine 
scientific research, would be excluded from its reach.  
Turning to the unrestrained collection of information on the 
composition of the seabed: is it permissible for one claimant State to 
engage in work, seeking to clarify the potential of oil and gas resources 
that are possibly contained in a disputed area, through the taking of a 
seismic survey that would perceivably place it in an advantageous 
position in relation to another claimant? On the basis of the two relevant 
cases, that is Guyana v. Suriname and the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf 
case, seismic work is essentially the only petroleum related activity that 
may unilaterally commence in maritime areas of overlapping claims.270 
In the latter, Greece exerted great efforts, which however failed, to 
convince the ICJ that the resulting discrepancy in knowledge level 
following from the Turkish seismic actions brought with it a range of 
detrimental effects that warranted the giving of interim protection—one 
of which was that a tender inviting the petroleum industry to bid for 
exploration rights would be likely to be received lukewarmly.271 Despite 
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these fairly ringing endorsements of the fact that there is a rule that 
permits claimants to engage in seismic surveying in a disputed area, there 
might, nonetheless, be some room for caution in applying this position 
mutatis mutandis to every perceivable locality where there are existing 
overlapping maritime boundary claims.272 Particularly, the uniqueness of 
each maritime boundary situation, which is determined and guided by its 
own intricacies, and the possible subsequent stirring up of different 
degrees of dispute when one claimant acts unilaterally within a particular 
situation, is one consideration that might argue against the universal 
definition of seismic work as a permissible unilateral activity in disputed 
areas. 
In comparing the two situations (i.e., where an oil and gas field 
straddles a maritime boundary or where it is found in an area of 
overlapping claims) that were at the center of analysis in this 
contribution, and the extent to which the rule of capture forms the 
guiding principle in these situations, there is some measure of 
discrepancy between them. Understood in the classic sense, as being 
concerned with exploitation, the rule of capture seems to have no validity 
within a disputed maritime area: international law prohibits a State from 
unilaterally embarking on conduct that involves starting to appropriate or 
appropriating oil and gas resources of the undelimited continental shelf.  
Regarding oil and gas resources that straddle a boundary at sea, the 
status of the rule of capture has not been valued equally; there is no 
outright dismissal of its validity by an international court or tribunal, and 
opinions expressed by commentators vary. A further criticism of the 
existence of a rule of capture in delimited maritime areas is that there is 
something highly unsatisfactory in the thought that on the one hand, in 
undelimited maritime areas, the state of international law is such that it 
prohibits unilateral development of an oil and gas field, not least for the 
irreversible effects it causes to the sovereign rights of claimant States and 
the exerted impact on the marine environment. To then, subsequently, on 
the other hand argue that once such a boundary been established and 
there is a straddling reservoir a rule of capture would, nonetheless, be 
activated no matter the extent of detriment to these same sovereign 
rights, particularly loss of revenue, another coastal States would suffer 
were one coastal State to maximize production from its own side of the 
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line. Therefore, as some commentators have suggested, it is prudent to 
abandon, due to its lack of convincingness, the division in treating an oil 
and gas field that straddles a maritime boundary or where it is located in 
a disputed area differently. Instead, the focus should be on the oil and gas 
deposit as such, in which all claimant States have a shared interest as 
well as certain sovereign rights.273  
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